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PERCEPTIONS OF EFFICACY,
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POTENTIAL CADAVERIC ORGAN–
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I
INTRODUCTION
In this empirical research project, we sought to explore the political
feasibility of potential policy reforms to address the shortage of cadaveric
organs for transplantation in America. We recruited 730 human subjects from
an online population and assigned them to writing tasks that experimentally
manipulated the salience of moral and posthumous risks. Subjects read ninetyfive-word descriptions of six proposed policy reforms, rating efficacy, morality,
and overall support for each. We created weighted estimates of the overall
potential support for each reform (WEOS), correcting for the skew in our study
population to very roughly approximate the political affiliations of the
American public.
Our data suggest that cultural cognition and perceptions of risk do not drive
policy choices about organ reform. Qualitatively, the writing tasks revealed
some ambivalence about the risk of having life-saving organs harvested without
consent, and they revealed tangible frustration about the risk of a loved one
dying for lack of a needed organ.
We found that Democrats were generally more supportive of reforms,
whereas Independents were less supportive, and Republicans were middling in
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their support. In particular, we found support for the proposal to make the
deceased person’s own organ choices controlling and not deferential to next of
kin (WEOS: 54%, with Democrat and Republican levels of support
indistinguishable). Respondents did not see personal choice as particularly
efficacious for resolving the shortage, but nonetheless morally important. In
contrast, respondents perceived opt-out to be highly effective, but morally
disconcerting. Nearly two-thirds of Democrats supported opt-out, and nearly
half of Republicans did so—a significant difference. However, two-thirds of
Independents were opposed, which drew the WEOS down to 46%.
We found an even clearer, broad consensus that a regulated market for
organs could be effective but would be deeply problematic morally (WEOS:
16%, with no detectable political split). On the other hand, another incentive,
the payment of vouchers for funeral expenses, enjoyed stronger support
(WEOS: 51%, with a majority of both Democrats and Republicans supporting
the proposal, but with the former even more so, given the 14% split). The
voucher assuages moral objections about the market while maintaining
apparent efficacy.
Our study also suggests that a package of reforms—including reciprocal
preferences, opt-out, and elimination of the family veto—may be feasible
politically (WEOS: 53%, and no political split detectable). This package of
reforms neutralizes moral objections to a reform based on reciprocal
preferences alone (WEOS: 41%, with a significant 10% split along party lines).
This study is best understood as a pilot for a future study with a
demographically valid sample. Nonetheless, the richness of the data suggests
that Americans make nuanced policy distinctions, which depend on how
proposals are packaged. We identify certain reforms that may enjoy broadbased support from across the political spectrum.
II
BACKGROUND
The shortage of cadaveric organs for transplantation is well-known, and the
philosophical, legal, and economic arguments about potential policy reforms
have been well-aired for decades. Yet organ policy in the United States remains
unchanged. The transplantation waiting lists grow, as do the numbers of those
who die while waiting.
Given the fractured political climate of 2014, the outlook for reform is grim.
As Ronald Dworkin wrote only seven years ago, “We are no longer partners in
1
self-government; our politics are rather a form of war.” Dworkin warned of an
“unbridgeable gulf” where there may be “no common ground to be found and
2
no genuine argument to be had.” It is, of course, an empirical question as to
1. RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL
DEBATE 1 (2006).
2. Id.; see also Imer B. Flores, The Problem of Democracy in Contexts of Polarization 3–4
(Georgetown Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research, Paper No. 13-017, 2013), available at
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whether there may be common ground on the particular questions of organtransplantation policy. If any reform is to become actual policy in a democratic
polity, it must reflect the political and cultural values of that polity, values that
may not be subject to precise conceptual distinctions used by philosophers and
lawyers. In this spirit, Dan Callahan has written that “[a] communitarian
bioethics would be one that sought to blend cultural judgment and personal
3
judgment.”
It is possible that the elite members of the academic intelligentsia and the
medical-transplant professionals, who have until now led the debate about
organ-transplantation policy, may have quite different political and cultural
commitments than do members of the American public or their elected and
4
appointed policymakers. Thus, for those serious about implementing life-saving
organ-policy reforms in the real world—one soaked in politics and culture—the
political and cultural feasibility of competing reforms demands closer study. In
this article, we broach that topic empirically.
According to a 2005 Gallup poll, Americans overwhelmingly support organ
5
donation. Furthermore, about three-quarters of Americans polled said they are
likely to have their organs donated upon death, and over half have actually
6
registered as donors. Of course, personal willingness to donate and support for
policy reform are distinct questions. As to the latter, one limitation of prior
research is that it has failed to attend to the likelihood that competing potential
7
reforms have divergent, or polarizing, cultural and political salience.
Opt-out systems (also known as presumed-consent or default-rule systems)
8
have been used successfully in Europe, and they have been endorsed by many
9
scholars in the United States. Yet Gallup reported that, as of 2005, Americans
did not widely support reform predicated upon opting out or presumed

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2211018.
3. Daniel Callahan, Bioethics: Private Choice and Common Good, 24 HASTINGS CENTER REP.
28, 31 (1994).
4. See Christopher F. Cardiff & Daniel B. Klein, Faculty Partisan Affiliations In All Disciplines: A
Voter-Registration Study, 17 CRITICAL REV. 237, 239 (2005) (showing a five-to-one skew in philosophy
departments); John O. McGinnis et al., The Patterns and Implications of Political Contributions by Elite
Law School Faculty, 93 GEO. L.J. 1167, 1176 (2005) (showing a five-to-one skew among politically
active law professors towards Democrats).
5. THE GALLUP ORG., NATIONAL SURVEY OF ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATION ATTITUDES
AND BEHAVIORS 5 (2005).
6. Id. Outside the United States, there is also a literature on attitudes towards organ
transplantation. See, e.g., Catalina Conesa et al., Psychological Profile in Favor of Organ Donation, 35
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 1276 (2003).
7. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of the Risks and Benefits of Nanotechnology, 4
NATURE NANOTECHNOLOGY 87 (2009) [hereinafter Kahan et al., Nanotechnology]; see also Flores,
supra note 2, at 13–16.
8. Laura A. Siminoff & Mary Beth Mercer, Public Policy, Public Opinion, and Consent for
Organ Donation, 10 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 377, 381 (2001).
9. See, e.g., Michael B. Gill, Presumed Consent, Autonomy, and Organ Donation, 29 J. MED. &
PHIL. 37 (2004).
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consent. Less than half of the population supported such a reform. In a 2001
study, Siminoff and Mercer also found that presumed consent was not viewed
12
favorably among the 600 individuals they studied. The authors also listed
13
objections to this system. One is that people who may have otherwise donated
their organs will distrust medical authorities and opt not to donate, and another
is that minorities—who are less likely to want to donate—would not be able to
14
take the necessary steps to not donate. Such a system has not been
implemented here, in part because it faces political opposition by some
individualists, who view it as an instance of “big government,” intruding into
the body conceived as a personal, rather than as a collective, resource.
Alternatively, some have proposed incentive-based models, including
payments of money or other material benefits for the giving of cadaveric organs
(either in a regulated free market or in a more limited system, such as one that
provides a voucher for funeral expenses). Gallup reports that less than one-fifth
of Americans say that a financial incentive would increase their likelihood of
15
donating their own or a family member’s organs. Siminoff and Mercer also
found that about one-quarter of their study participants would be offended at a
financial incentive to donate their family members’ organs upon death, one16
quarter would not be offended, and one-fifth would appreciate it. To some
egalitarians, the thought of a financial incentive for organs may evoke the worst
of capitalism, in which the human body is commoditized and the rich exploit the
poor. A 2003 study by Mehmet and colleagues of surgeons and other
transplantation professionals distinguished between “indirect” forms of
compensation (such as payment of funeral expenses), which seventy percent of
the study’s participants supported, and “direct” forms of compensation (for
example, a tax credit or life-insurance benefit), which about as many within the
17
study opposed. Thus, it appears that the framing and the details of the
incentive scheme matter.
The cultural significance of reciprocity-based models—like those tried in
18
19
Israel and Singapore, in which registered organ donors receive priority access
to available organs—are less obvious. Such proposals may be attractive to
individualists who emphasize personal responsibility (because, in such a
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION, supra note 5, at 20–21.
Id.
Siminoff & Mercer, supra note 8, at 382.
Id. at 381.
Id.
THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION, supra note 5, at 23–24.
Siminoff & Mercer, supra note 8, at 382.
Mehmet C. Oz et al., How to Improve Organ Donation: Results of the ISHLT/FACT Poll, 22 J.
HEART & LUNG TRANSPLANTATION 389 (2003).
18. See, e.g., Jacob Lavee & Avraham Stoler, Reciprocal Altruism—The Impact of Resurrecting an
Old Moral Imperative on the National Organ Donation Rate in Israel, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no.
3, 2014, at 323.
19. See Alireza Bagheri, Organ Transplantation Laws in Asian Countries: A Comparative Study, 37
TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 4159, 4160–61 (2005).
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reciprocity-based system, the choice not to give has consequences). Haidt has
argued that liberals and conservatives differ on their conceptions of fairness,
with the former emphasizing notions of equality and the latter emphasizing
20
“proportionality” (perhaps an Aristotelian notion of justice as desert). On this
latter notion, reciprocity-based models might be more attractive to
conservatives. Or perhaps liberals might also see them as attractive to the
extent that all who join the social contract are treated equally.
Finally, regardless of the policy regime, the ultimate question about
transplantation might be decided by next-of-kin after death, and a law might
resolve whether the family should have final “veto power” over the individual’s
own choice or lack thereof. This policy also might have political and cultural
valence, with individualists perhaps seeing the organ choice as personal, and
communitarians seeing it as more familial. In the survey of transplantation
professionals, most favored consulting the family unless the decedent had
21
himself signed a donation card.
These policy choices implicitly raise questions about how to weigh relative
risk, questions that have motivated scholars and might motivate the public and
22
policymakers as well. On the one hand, there is the risk that someone might
need an organ transplantation but fail to secure such a transplantation because
of the severe shortage. On the other hand, there is the risk that someone might
prefer not to have his or her cadaveric organs transplanted, but might
nonetheless have his or her organs removed after death. It might be that
individuals differently perceive the relative probability and severity of these
risks in ways that inform their policy preferences.
Kahan has found that cultural cognition can result in polarization about
policy choices when individuals are given balanced information about a
particular risk, even when individuals did not have any opinions about the topic
23
before being asked about it. It is their “cultural predisposition toward risk”
that leads individuals to “construe or assimilate information, whatever its
provenance, in opposing ways that reinforce the risk perceptions they are
predisposed to form. As a result, individuals end up in a state of cultural
24
conflict—not over values, but over facts . . . .” Furthermore, individuals are
more likely to recall information that supports their cultural worldview and are
25
more likely to attribute credibility to experts they view as sharing their values.
Aside from cultural salience, each of these policy choices can be evaluated
along multiple dimensions. One reform proposal might be highly effective in
20. JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS
AND RELIGION 161 (2013).
21.
22.
23.
24.

Mehmet C. Oz et al., supra note 17, at 391.
See, e.g., Gill, supra note 9, at 52–55.
Kahan et al., Nanotechnology, supra note 7, at 88.
Dan M. Kahan, Cultural Cognition as a Conception of the Cultural Theory of Risk, in
HANDBOOK OF RISK THEORY 725, 746 (S. Roeser et al. eds., 2012).
25. Dan M. Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus, 14 J. RISK RES. 147, 166–67
(2011).
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reducing the organ shortage, but deeply objectionable from a moral point of
view. Another reform proposal might have the opposite profile. Still other
reform proposals might shine in terms of both perceived efficacy and morality,
but prove lacking in other aspects. Further, it remains to be seen whether
people are more driven by efficacy or morality in making choices about organtransplantation reform. Of course, efficacy and morality overlap to the extent
that reducing the organ shortage saves lives and reduces suffering, but there are
also other moral concerns of autonomy and justice, which might function more
like side constraints.
We approached these questions empirically, using the cultural-cognition
scale and measures of political identity to explore the heterogeneity of
responses to each of these policy reform proposals. Through systematic
experimental manipulation, we also tried to make the competing risks more
salient for respondents. Finally, we teased apart efficacy, morality, and overall
preferences for each policy reform, using separate questions. Aside from
revealing which proposals enjoy the most support, this approach revealed
whether some proposals might be more polarizing than others, a factor that
might be important in settings governed by nonmajoritarian decision rules (such
26
as the U.S. Senate). If the study reveals cultural heterogeneity in policy
preferences, they may be mapped onto geographic variations across the United
States, which might also suggest that a decentralized (federalist) approach to
policy reform might be more effective than national efforts that might be
stymied by a lack of cultural consensus favoring reform.
We hypothesized that a hybrid policy-reform package—which includes
elements of default rules, the social norm of reciprocity, and elimination of the
27
post hoc family veto—might enjoy more political and cultural feasibility. This
type of coherent hybrid of such policies might be more achievable than any one
reform in isolation.
III
METHODS
In this section we discuss our methods, including a description of the stimuli
(the materials to which our participants responded) and the instrument (our
means of recording those responses), along with the demographics of our
participants. Other details appear in the appendix to this article. The appendix
provides the text of our stimuli in particular.
A. Stimulus and Instrument
First, we collected demographic information (sex, ethnicity, year of birth,
education, and zip code). In order to prepare the subjects for the task, and to
26. See Delia Baldassarri & Peter Bearman, Dynamics of Political Polarization, 72 AM. SOC. REV.
784, 801–04 (2007); Flores, supra note 2, at 9–10.
27. See Christopher Tarver Robertson, From Free Riders to Fairness: A Cooperative System for
Organ Transplantation, 48 JURIMETRICS 1, 26–40 (2007) (proposing one such hybrid proposal).
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focus them upon the questions at hand, we presented all of them with a 286word passage that provided neutral background information about cadaveric
28
organ-transplantation and the shortage of organs.
Next, subjects were randomized to one of three conditions (a three-by-one
design) to make the competing risks of the organ-transplantation system more
salient. In the “Need” condition, subjects were asked to imagine themselves in a
situation in which someone they love needs an organ but is unable to get one,
and to write about what they would experience and feel in that situation. In the
“Taken” condition, subjects were asked to imagine themselves in a situation in
which someone they love dies and has cadaveric organs harvested without his or
her consent, and to write about what they would experience and feel in that
situation. In the control condition, there was no writing task.
Next, subjects were given instructions and then sequentially shown six pairs
of organ policies in a within-subjects design. These sets of policies consisted of
counterpoised descriptions of the status quo organ policy in the United States
(first) versus a proposed reform (second). The policy sets each had a concise
title describing the policy choice at issue: “Opt-In vs. Opt-Out,” “Family Choice
vs. Personal Choice,” “Altruistic Donations vs. Regulated Market,”
“Voluntarism Alone vs. Funeral Vouchers,” “Open Eligibility vs. Reciprocal
Preference,” and “Current Package vs. Reform Package.” We designed the
policy descriptions to minimize jargon and complex language, to be neutral in
valence, and to be consistent in tone and length (each approximated ninety-five
words). We pilot-tested the policies with a class of law students and
undergraduate students to assess the policies’ clarity, as well as the potential
for bias, and we made revisions. The first five sets of policies consisted of
individual policy reforms and were shown in random order. The sixth policy
pair consisted of a package of reforms, consisting of three of the individual
reforms previously considered (opt-out, personal choice, and reciprocal
preference). Each pair of policies was shown on a separate page, followed by
three questions about each, and participants were not allowed to go back to
previous policies.
Below each policy pair, we asked the following three questions. First,
“Which system will produce more organs for transplantation?” We coded this
answer as “efficacy.” Second, “Which system is more acceptable from a moral
point of view?” We coded this answer as “morality.” Third, “Overall, which
system do you prefer?” We coded this answer as “overall preference.”
Respondents answered each question on a bidirectional nine-point Likert scale
(shown in the appendix) with each anchor naming the alternatives (for example,
opt-in and opt-out).
After answering for each of the six policy sets, we administered the culturalcognition scale (short version), including a second attention check therein. We
asked about political affiliation on a six-level scale (ranging from strong

28. See infra Methodological Appendix.
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democrat to strong republican, with two leaning independent levels in the
middle), which we collapsed to three levels for analyses. Finally, subjects were
allowed to provide open-ended responses concerning “any thoughts or
comments about organ donation policy in the United States,” if they chose to
do so.
B. Participants and Randomization
We applied for and received “exempt” approval by the Human Subjects
Protection Program at the University of Arizona. Inclusion criteria required
that subjects be within the United States geographically, over the age of
eighteen, and able to read and write English. We focused on those within the
United States because we were particularly interested in reforms that could be
politically and culturally feasible for that particular polity. The study makes no
29
claim to universality.
We conducted the study online, recruiting human subjects from Amazon
30
Mechanical Turk (Mturk). Our final dataset for analysis included 730
31
responses. As shown in table 1, our study population was similar to the
demographics of the United States census in terms of gender. However, it did
not include many subjects who lack a high school diploma or GED. Our sample
also severely underrepresents those over the age of sixty. It also consisted of a
somewhat larger proportion of whites than the national population.
Randomization succeeded in distributing subjects across conditions.
Regression analyses (not shown) found that these demographic factors are not
significantly correlated with our dependent variables, so we proceed with
discussions of central tendencies and proportions.

29. See Jeffrey J. Arnett, The Neglected 95%: Why American Psychology Needs to Become Less
American, 63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 602, 607–09 (2008); Joseph Henrich et al., The Weirdest People in the
World?, 33 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 61, 63 (2010).
30. Mturk, a human-subject population associated with Amazon.com, is increasingly utilized for
social science research. See Adam J. Berinsky et al., Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental
Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 351, 351 (2012); Gabriele Paolacci et al.,
Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 411, 411
(2010); Danielle N. Shapiro et al., Using Mechanical Turk to Study Clinical Populations, 1 CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. SCI. 213, 213 (2012).
31. Recruitment and data cleaning procedures are described in the Methodological Appendix.

4_ROBERTSON_YOKUM_WRIGHT_EIC (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 3 2014]

11/11/2014 4:01 PM

CADAVERIC ORGAN-TRANSPLANTATION REFORMS

109

Table 1: Demographic Data by Experimental Condition and Compared to U.S.
Census32
Legend: Frequency (Percentage)

1 (0%)
34 (12%)
100 (35%)
112 (39%)
35 (12%)

Need
Prime
(n = 214)
1 (0%)
15 (7%)
100 (47%)
74 (35%)
24 (11%)

Taken
Prime
(n = 234)
1 (0%)
26 (11%)
80 (34%)
89 (38%)
38 (16%)

Total
Subjects
(N = 730)
3 (0%)
75 (10%)
280 (38%)
275 (38%)
97 (13%)

Male
Female

141 (50%)
141 (50%)

98 (46%)
116 (54%)

107 (46%)
127 (54%)

346 (47%)
384 (53%)

49%
51%

18–24
25–34
35–44
45–59
60+

54 (19%)
115 (41%)
50 (18%)
45 (16%)
18 (6%)

34 (16%)
86 (40%)
46 (22%)
37 (17%)
11 (5%)

40 (17%)
89 (38%)
42 (18%)
47 (20%)
16 (9%)

128 (18%)
290 (40%)
138 (19%)
129 (18%)
45 (6%)

13%
18%
19%
27%
23%

White
Nonwhite

239 (85%)
43 (15%)

183 (86%)
31 (14%)

203 (87%)
31 (13%)

625 (86%)
105 (14%)

74%
26%

Education
< HS Diploma or GED
HS Diploma or GED
Some College or Assoc.
College Grad
Graduate Degree

Control
(n = 282)

U.S.
Census33
15%
30%
28%
18%
9%

Gender

Age Groups

Race

Political Affiliation34
Democrat
Independent
Republican

Pew
111 (39%)
134 (48%)
37 (13%)

74 (35%)
109 (51%)
31 (15%)

79 (33%)
122 (52%)
33 (14%)

264 (36%)
365 (50%)
101 (14%)

31%
39%
24%

IV
RESULTS
We provide specifics and analyses below, distinguishing by the respondents’
32. Due to rounding, sets of percentages might not add to one-hundred percent.
33. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (2012), available
at http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/2012/tables.html.
34. Pew political distribution in taken from a national phone survey conducted April 4, 2012 in
which five percent of the respondents indicated “don’t know” or “no preference,” options that were not
available in our online instrument. THE PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS,
TRENDS IN AMERICAN VALUES: 1987–2012, PARTISAN POLARIZATION SURGES IN BUSH, OBAMA
YEARS 141 (2012) [hereinafter PEW, AMERICAN VALUES], availabe at http://www.peoplepress.org/files/legacy-pdf/06-04-12%20Values%20Release.pdf . Political affiliations from our study are
collapsed from six-level scale used in the instrument to three levels, to be comparable to the Pew
results.
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perceptions of efficacy, morality, and overall preference, and splitting the
respondents by political affiliations. In short, our data suggest that cultural
cognition and perceptions of risk do not drive policy choices about organ
reform. Qualitatively, the writing tasks revealed some ambivalence about the
risk of having life-saving organs harvested without consent and revealed
tangible frustration about the risk of a loved one dying for lack of a needed
organ. Quantitatively, we found that Democrats were generally more
supportive of reforms, while Independents were less supportive, and
Republicans were middling in their support. Across the various reform
proposals, we found strengths and weaknesses, but we found broad consensus
that a regulated market for organs could be effective but would be deeply
problematic morally. On the other hand, another incentive, the payment of
vouchers for funeral expenses, enjoyed stronger support, as it assuages moral
objections. We found that a package of reforms—including reciprocal
preferences, opt-out, and elimination of the family veto—may be feasible
politically. This package of reforms neutralizes moral objections to a reform
based on reciprocal preferences alone.
A. Efficacy, Morality, and Overall Preferences for Reforms
Respondents evaluated each proposed reform in terms of its efficacy in
increasing the number of organs available for transplantation, its morality, and
its overall attractiveness. These results are compiled in table 2. Figure 1 plots
probability-density estimates, which are essentially smoothed histograms. We
found that respondents did make such distinctions, sometimes making
diametrically opposite evaluations as to morality and efficacy, with overall
support sometimes tracking efficacy (for the opt-out) and sometimes tracking
morality (for the regulated market).
Overall, we found the greatest support for removing the “family veto” (a
term not used in the stimulus) and instead for enforcing the deceased person’s
personal organ choice. As one participant stated in an open-ended response,
“Personal choice is a must regarding the donation of organs.” Also enjoying
strong support were the “funeral recognition” proposal to create a voucher to
pay for the deceased organ donor’s burial expenses, and the proposal to move
towards an opt-out system, where organ sharing would become the default rule.
All three of these policy proposals scored medians of seven on the nine-point
scale for overall preferences.
In contrast, the proposal to use financial incentives more directly, by moving
towards a regulated market for organs, was the least attractive, with a median of
three on the overall preference scale. It is informative that the two methods of
financial incentives—regulated market and funeral vouchers—had diametrically
opposite evaluations.
In terms of efficacy, on the median, respondents thought that all of the
proposed reforms would tend towards increasing the supply of organs for
transplantation compared to the status quo (medians greater than five), except
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for the elimination of the family veto, in which respondents were evenly split as
to efficacy. The move to an opt-out system and creation of a funeral-voucher
system were thought to be most efficacious (medians of nine and eight
respectively). Regarding the optional open-ended questions at the end of the
survey, the dominant response was that the best policy change would be to an
opt-out system. Two typical responses are as follows:
I think everything should remain the same except the opt-in/opt-out feature. I think all
too often people forget to sign up to be an organ donor but would like to. Having the
opt-out feature, the people that are passionate about NOT donating will be more
willing to fill out the paperwork required to keep their organs. If someone has a
reason they don’t want to donate their organs, they will make sure they are signed up
to avoid donation because it will actually be important to them.
I’m personally not signed up, and to be honest, I think Opt-Out is definitely the way it
should be. A lot of people probably don’t ever Opt-In because it’s simply . . . nothing
that ever crosses their mind!

In terms of moral evaluation, respondents reported greater variation across
proposals. The creation of a regulated market for organs was viewed as most
problematic from a moral perspective (median of two), followed by the granting
of reciprocal preferences for those giving and receiving organs (median of
three). As one respondent wrote regarding reciprocal preferences,
I do not think that the reciprocal preference is [sic] a good idea. As was mentioned
earlier, most people just never think to make the decision of whether they want to be
an organ donor. Just because someone is not already registered does not mean they
are unwilling to be. Giving preference to registered organ donors is grossly unfair
when it is a matter of life and death.

And another stated, “It’d feel ‘icky’ to deny non–organ donors a transplant,
or rather, put them further down the list, because of their choice.”
The median respondent scored a five, thereby expressing no moral
preference between, on the on hand, the opt-out and funeral-voucher proposals,
and, on the other hand, the corresponding elements of the status quo. The
median respondent was more supportive of the morality of reforming the status
quo by enforcing individual choices, rather than choices of next-of-kin (median
of seven).
Synthesizing these results, one can see that the regulated-market proposal
was perplexing for respondents. It was viewed as one of the most efficacious
(median of seven) but least moral (median of two) solutions. The respondents’
overall evaluation of the regulated-market proposal (median of three) tracked
more closely to respondents’ moral positions than to their perceptions of
efficacy. Comparing the market to the funeral-vouchers proposal (both on the
middle row of figure 1), we were interested to find that the two methods
utilizing financial incentives had diametrically opposite evaluations. As we tease
morality concerns (the light dotted line) apart from efficacy concerns (the dark
dotted line), we find that, although the modal respondent has deep moral
objections to the market proposal, he or she is ambivalent about the voucher
program, perhaps because the voucher program does not raise such severe
concerns about commodification and equity. As for efficacy concerns in
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isolation, the subjects concede the efficacy of both the market and the voucher
solutions, although they view the voucher as even more effective, perhaps
because they view the crowding-out problem as neutralized. The
aforementioned moral gap between the voucher and market proposal is enough
to lead to different overall evaluations (bold solid line) of each.
The reciprocal-preferences proposal also had opposite valences with regard
to efficacy (median of seven) versus morality (median of three). However, for
this proposal, the overall evaluations tracked more closely with the efficacy
score, and it enjoyed an overall positive valence of support (median of six).
We also assessed a particular package of reforms, which included reciprocal
preference, opt-out, and personal choice. This package proposal was perceived
as being highly effective (median of eight), morally neutral (median of five),
and overall rather positive (median of seven). The package itself, when
evaluated alongside its component reforms by comparing its efficacy, morality,
and efficacy means to the mean of the individual reforms’ means (not shown in
Table 2) was viewed as somewhat more efficacious (mean of 7.01 compared to
6.51), slightly less moral (mean of 4.74 compared to 5.07), and slightly better
overall (mean of 5.93 compared to 5.79). As one respondent wrote of the
reform package,
Overall, I think the best package would be the one you proposed, with optout, personal choice, and reciprocating. I don’t think that anyone, such as
businesses, should be able to profit by selling organs, but I do think it’s fair to
give priority to those who are willing to give organs themselves. And this choice
should never involve[] the family’s wishes unless the patient who passes hasn’t
specified (even though I’d still prefer the opt-out option to family’s making the
decisions).
Notably, the reciprocal-preferences proposal suffered from a negative moral
evaluation, compared to “open eligibility.” But when that reform was paired
with opt-out and with personal choice, the moral valence shifted toward
neutrality. This finding illustrates the possibility that a packaging of reforms
might in some ways rectify the problems perceived with individual parts. In
other words, the package was not judged by its weakest link.

4_ROBERTSON_YOKUM_WRIGHT_EIC (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 3 2014]

11/11/2014 4:01 PM

CADAVERIC ORGAN-TRANSPLANTATION REFORMS

113

Table 2: Efficacy, Morality, and Overall Evaluation of Reforms in Control
Condition
criterion

mean

sd

median

se

Altruistic donations vs. regulated market
Efficacy

5.94

2.68

7

0.16

Morality

2.67

2.12

2

0.13

Overall

3.48

2.62

3

0.16

Family choice vs. personal choice
Efficacy

5.29

2.69

5

0.16

Morality

6.78

2.2

7

0.13

Overall

6.31

2.78

7

0.17

Open eligibility vs. reciprocal preference
Efficacy

6.53

2.65

7

0.16

Morality

4.04

2.68

3

0.16

Overall

5.16

2.97

6

0.18

9
5
7

0.13
0.14
0.18

Opt-in vs. opt-out
Efficacy
Morality
Overall

7.71
4.4
5.9

2.21
2.39
2.98

Voluntarism alone vs. funeral recognition
Efficacy

7.3

1.99

8

0.12

Morality

4.64

2.32

5

0.14

Overall

6.21

2.66

7

0.16

Current package vs. new package
Efficacy

7.01

2.15

8

0.13

Morality

4.74

2.28

5

0.14

Overall

5.93

2.72

7

0.16

Legend: n = 282. Scores were on nine-point bidirectional scales,
with higher scores (above 5.0) indicating support for the policy
reform (always listed second in the pairing, with the status quo
listed first).
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Figure 1: Probability-Density Plots of Overall Preferences in Policy Choice
Pairs, with Perceptions of Efficacy and Morality

Efficacy

Morality

Overall Preference

Legend: n = 730. All subjects are plotted.
B. Variation by Political Affiliations and Cultural Cognition
Individuals’ self-reported political affiliations were correlated with their
organ-policy preferences, but respondents were not strongly polarized along
political lines. And there are many instances of consensus.
Political affiliation was measured on a six-level scale, from strong Democrat
to strong Republican, with two levels of leaning independents in the middle.
For purposes of figure 2, these six levels are collapsed to three levels to reflect a
simplified political valence, and the nine-level scale measuring support for one
of the policies versus the other is collapsed into a binary choice of support
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versus not-support. We coded those in the middle level of five as not supporting
the reform, which makes the apparent levels of support lower than they
otherwise might be (about ten to fifteen percent of respondents were in this
middle position).
This analysis reveals that the political affiliations might be associated with
differences of opinion on organ policy, with Democrats tending to favor the
proposed reforms more often, with independents less motivated for reform
overall, and with Republicans in the middle. Compared to Republicans,
Democrats were particularly strong in their relative support for three reforms:
opt-out (a sixteen-percent gap, p = 0.01), funeral recognition (a fourteenpercent gap, p = 0.02), and reciprocal preference (a ten-percent gap, p = 0.05).
Interestingly, the funeral-recognition proposal—a type of financial incentive—
enjoys more support from Democrats than Republicans, while the more direct
proposal for a regulated market trends in the opposite direction.
Although Republicans are often associated with free-market reforms, we
find less than five percent of them scoring the regulated-market reform as
having the strongest level of support (nine), a rate that is indistinguishable from
the Democrats in the sample. Democrats and Republicans alike favored staying
with the altruistic system of the status quo compared with the free-market
reform option.
As shown in figure 2, we also created weighted estimates of overall support
for each reform proposal, which correct for the political skew in our study
population by weighting according to the Pew’s recent measurement of the
35
national distribution of Democrats, Republicans, and independents , and
thereby roughly simulate the potential level of support from the American
public. In comparison, we observed that the Mturk population exhibits a
leftward skew, with 2.3 times as many subjects identifying as Democrats
(including strong Democrat, Democrat, or independent lean Democrat such
that n = 512), compared to those identifying as Republicans (including all three
levels such that n = 218). Although this reweighting does not dramatically
change our raw estimates (a difference of two percentage points at the
maximum), it still requires a particular note of caution. It is likely that our
Republicans might still be unlike the broader American population of
Republicans in ways that are not observable in our sample (and likewise for the
independents and Democrats). As we emphasize further in the limitations
section below, our study is no substitute for a demographically valid survey of
the American population.

35. PEW, AMERICAN VALUES, supra note 34, at 147; see supra Table 1.
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The cultural-cognition framework also provided insight on our data, though
the effects were few and small. Building from the work of Widvalsky and
Douglas on the one hand and Dake on the other, Kahan has created reliable
attitudinal scales meant to measure the extent to which a person is hierarchical
or egalitarian and to measure the extent to which a person is an individualist or
37
a communitarian. Individualism refers to a weak orientation toward group life,
38
whereas communitarian refers to a strong orientation to group life.
Hierarchical refers to a strong social stratification on the basis of status
characteristics, whereas egalitarianism refers to a weak social stratification on

36. Legend: Sorted by overall weighted support, 95% confidence intervals shown. Support for
reform is based on top four levels of nine-point scale; an additional 10%–15% were neutral. Each
political affiliation shown here consists of two levels on the six-level scale. Compared to Republicans,
Democrats were stronger in their support for three reforms: opt-out (a 16% gap, p = 0.01), funeral
recognition (a 14% gap, p = 0.02), and reciprocal preference (a 10% gap, p = 0.05).
37. Kahan et al., Nanotechnology, supra note 7, at 87; see MARY DOUGLAS & ADAM
WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 121–22 (1982); Karl Dake, Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of
Risk: An Analysis of Contemporary Worldviews and Cultural Biases, 22 J. CROSS-CULTURAL
PSYCHOL. 61, 62 (1991).
38. Kahan et al., Nanotechnology, supra note 7, at 87.
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39

the basis of status characteristics.
We predicted that respondents would be polarized depending on their
cultural preferences. We did find differences in opinions for two of the policy
proposals, namely, opt-out and regulated market. In particular, hierarchical–
individualists were about half as likely to overall prefer the opt-out reform as
were egalitarian–communitarians (p < 0.001). Egalitarians tended to support
the reform towards opt-out, regardless of whether they were communitarians or
individualists.
Additionally, egalitarian–communitarians were significantly more likely
than all other cultural-cognition groups to perceive a market for organ
transplantation as morally objectionable (p < 0.01). They were also less likely
overall to prefer the reform compared to hierarchical–communitarians (p <
0.05) and hierarchical individualists (p < 0.01). Of the egalitarian–
communitarians, nearly thirty percent indicated the strongest preference
possible for maintaining the status quo of altruistic donations. However, it bears
emphasis that all four cultural-cognition types were generally opposed to the
regulated-market proposal.
C. Responses to Manipulated Risk-Salience Writing Tasks
As explained in our Methods section, we randomly assigned subjects to one
of three different experimental conditions, in which we sought to manipulate
the salience of the competing perceptions of risk concerning organ40
transplantation policy. Prior research has shown that these sorts of writing
tasks can increase the salience of emotional and other contextual factors in
decision making. For example, Tiedens and Linton demonstrated an effectual
41
priming of emotional states, and Kvaran, Nichols, and Sanfey primed an
42
analytic mode of thought. Also, Sieck and Yayes demonstrated that exposition
43
reduces the framing effect (a heuristic for decision making).
In our study, the writing tasks had the effect of increasing attrition in the
two treatment conditions. This raised a concern that self-selection might defeat

39. Id.
40. See discussion supra Part II.A. In the “Need” condition, subjects performed a writing task in
which they imagined that someone that they loved desperately needed an organ transplantation, but
did not receive one due to the severe organ shortage. In the “Taken” condition, subjects performed a
writing task in which they imagined that someone they loved had a strong preference to be buried with
his or her body intact, but instead died and had his or her cadaveric organs removed against his or her
will. In the control condition, there was no writing task.
41. Larissa Z. Tiedens & Susan Linton, Judgment Under Emotional Certainty and Uncertainty: The
Effects of Specific Emotions on Information Processing, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 973,
983–85 (2001).
42. Trevor Kvaran, Shaun Nichols & Alan Sanfey, The Effect of Analytic and Experiential Modes
of Thought on Moral Judgment, in PROGRESS IN BRAIN RESEARCH 187, 192–94 (V.S. Chandrasekhar
Pammi & Narayanan Srinivasan eds., 2013).
43. Winston Sieck & J. Frank Yates, Exposition Effects on Decision Making: Choice and
Confidence in Choice, 70 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 207, 214–18
(1997).
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our random assignment (that assignment being our ‘intention to treat’). On our
dependent variables, however, we found few important effects across
experimental conditions. In eighteen logistic regressions (for three dependent
variables of efficacy, morality, and overall support for all six policies), we found
only two significant (p < .05) effects of experimental condition, each pertaining
to the reform package: The taken prime increases the likelihood of perceiving
the reform package as efficacious ( = .49; odds ratio = 1.63), while the need
prime increases the likelihood of perceiving the reform package as morally
44
acceptable ( = .40; odds ratio = 1.49). These findings might be artifacts of
45
having made so many statistical comparisons.
Although the writing tasks did not seem to impact the respondents’ support
for various policy reforms, the responses themselves yield interesting insights
about how people think about the competing risks of dying for lack of an organ
versus having an organ harvested without consent. We used an inductive coding
methodology to analyze qualitatively the responses provided by subjects in each
experimental condition (“need” vs. “taken”). Overall, we found that the need
condition evoked feelings of sadness, devastation, and hopelessness, along with
both blame and resentment of those who decline to transplant organs along
with the system that produces a shortage. Overall, although some people felt
very angry about the nonconsensual harvesting, we found that the dominant
response in the taken condition was one of ambivalence. The excerpts exhibited
below have been edited for length and style.
D. Need Condition
Asking people to imagine that a loved one is suffering from liver failure and
needs a transplant in order to live, but is unable to get one in time, resulted in
highly emotional responses from participants. In fact, one participant stated
that the exercise was “relatively taxing for the amount to be paid” because the
imagination task required them to actually feel sad. Words like “devastating,”
“heartbreaking,” “angry,” “helpless,” and “hopeless” dominated the responses.
The following response is paradigmatic.
I would feel completely grief-stricken. I would already begin to feel the loss of my
loved one even though they are still alive. I would feel hopeless and morose, cursing
the unfairness of life, irrationally jealous and angry at other people who have received

44. One potential explanation for our null results is that our experimental manipulation might
have worn off as respondents proceeded through the six policy-reform choices. Although the individual
polices were presented in random order, the reform package was always presented last. Because
significant differences were only observed in the package, the wear-off hypothesis is not supported.
45. We also expected that our experimental manipulations would cause the cultural relevance of
the organ shortage and potential reform proposals to become more pronounced and perhaps thereby
increase polarization on the cultural-cognition scale. This hypothesis was not strongly supported,
though some effect was observed. The “Taken” prime—which raised concerns about organs being
removed without consent—made no difference for the hierarchical individualists, but made the
egalitarian–individualists much more supportive of the opt-in reform. Those respondents apparently
realized that the risk of having organs removed after death was really not a concern worth having, and
thus increased their resolve towards an opt-out system.
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liver transplants in time.

Many participants highlighted their frustration with the organ shortage,
argued that more people should donate their organs, and offered suggestions
about how to increase organ donation. Ironically, some of these participants
were not themselves organ donors, but stated that thinking about this situation
made them seriously consider becoming an organ donor.
The strong negative emotions felt by participants in reaction to the writing
prompt also led some of them to blame nondonors’ beliefs for the organ
shortage. One participant called beliefs against organ donation “superstitious
nonsense.” Others noted that people are misinformed about organ donation
and mistakenly believe that doctors will let them die so their organs can be
46
transplanted to someone else.
Surely, enough people die all the time to provide adequate organs to those who need
them. I suspect that the reason that more organs are not available is because many
people have bizarre religious beliefs which make them unnaturally attached to the
dead bodies of their friends and families.

Regardless of whether nondonors’ beliefs were attacked, often participants
felt resentful of nondonors and attacked their decision not to donate. These
critiques were often about how organs were of no use to the dead and would be
better off helping the living. As one participant put it, “Not to be crude but
people die every day and there have to be thousands of usable organs
essentially being thrown away.”
However, not everyone was angry at nondonors. For some, the primary
focus of their distress was the suffering and pending death of their loved one.
Most distressing to me is the fact that she suffers each moment that she has to wait,
due to the pain and stress on her body. I am not angry at “the system” per se, as anger
in this case is pointless and that I am a faithful person and don’t really measure
everything in terms of what the world owes me or anyone I love. I am praying every
chance I get now, with a faith that something good will come from this situation.

Other participants targeted American society and culture more broadly in
their emotionally laden responses.
I would think that . . . the United States, which proclaims itself to be the best place in
the world, wouldn’t allow this to happen to anybody. After being grief stricken, I
would feel enraged. Enraged that after all the taxes we pay, as an American, that this
can’t be resolved.

Some participants blamed healthcare providers and scientists for not being
able to prevent the tragedy they were asked to imagine. Others suspected that
persons with wealth, fame, or other forms of privilege have a greater chance of
receiving an organ than the average person. When discussing the problem of
organ shortages, one participant noted, “[t]here are ways to exploit the waiting
list (typically money or political power) to bump your name closer to the top of
the list. In my family’s case, that would mean life and death.” Another stated
that, “It would be frustrating that people who were financially better-off would
have more access to treatments than my friend would.”
46. This is a distinct form of risk that could be explored in future experimental manipulations.
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Although the majority of responses to the prompt focused on the grief
participants would feel in the imagined situation, some participants were
reflective about the perversity of wishing for an available organ. They noted
that an available organ would mean that someone else had to die, and that
another family was feeling what they were feeling. They still hoped for an
organ, however, but would feel sad, ashamed, or guilty if their loved one
received one. Another common response to the writing prompt was for
participants to become task-oriented and to focus less on what they would feel
and more on what they would do in the situation. Although some participants
said they would do everything they legally could to obtain a liver for their dying
loved one, some admitted they would look on the black market for a liver.
A minority of participants responded that they would be at peace with the
fact that their loved one was dying. Some argued that death was natural and
that life should not be prolonged in the case of organ failure. Others made
statements emphasizing that it was not “really anyone’s duty to die so that
someone I know can live.” Others said it was up to God to determine when it is
time for a person to die; thus they expressed neither anger toward non-donors
nor frustration with the lack of available organs.
Several subjects suggested increasing public awareness of and discussion
about the problem of organ shortage. The following are some of their
suggestions for increasing awareness: public service announcements
encouraging organ donation and emphasizing how donation helps others, “large
informational media campaigns” explaining various reform proposals, “heavy
marketing campaigns” meant to make altruism popular, and information for
people on how to become donors. Of course, these are the core features of the
47
status quo, which have so far proven insufficient. Others focused on educating
individuals about organ donation through the public-school system and allowing
students the opportunity to register as donors in school. These participants also
argued that engaging in a discussion about organ donation in an educational
setting would mitigate the negative effects of the “sensationalized stories of
people killed in Brazil for their organs.”
E. Taken Condition
Participants had a range of responses to the writing prompt that asked them
to imagine that their loved one’s organs were transplanted upon death, despite
their loved ones’ strong wishes not to be an organ donor, but that the
transplantation saved the life of another.
The dominant response was one of feeling ambivalent. Many participants
noted that, on the one hand, they were upset that their loved one’s wishes that
their body be buried in its entirety were not followed. On the other hand, many
stated that they would eventually come to peace with what had happened

47. Amitai Etzioni, Organ Donation: A Communitarian Approach, 13 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J.
1, 6–14 (2003).
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because another’s life was saved. Participants often used the phrases “feel
conflicted” or “have mixed feelings” in order to express their reaction.
If this happened to someone very close to me, I would feel conflicted. On one hand, I
would be saddened and disturbed that the wishes of this person were not
recognized . . . . On the other hand, I would be happy and delighted for the person
whose life was saved. I would be able to take solace in the fact that someone was
helped.

Still, another common response to this situation was anger or even outrage
that a loved one’s body had been violated. As one participant put it, “That is a
total disrespect toward the family just going in there acting like it’s the pick n
pull and a car junk yard and grabbing whatever part you need for the next car.
We are talking about a human being here.” Many used the words “outraged,”
“furious,” “very upset,” or “appalled.”
Some participants framed their outrage in religious terms, while others
framed their objections in terms of improper medical practice and theft of
organs. Many reported a desire to sue the hospital.
God gave these organs to my loved one at birth and he should have “gone home” with
these organs intact. Government and family members do not have the right to make a
decision as serious as this when my loved one was adamant about his beliefs.

Some participants stated that they would never trust doctors again. As one
participant noted, “Over time I think I would come to my senses and would be
happy for the lady whose life was saved with the donation. Still I would always
be distrusting the medical system and feel like they had taken advantage of
me.” Another compared it to a case they had heard about where dead bodies
were “pillaged”:
I would be aghast, and even appalled, that I w[as] not consulted about having her
organs removed before it was done. It would remind me of the horrific case in New
York/Philadelphia where dead bodies were pillaged for bone, skin, etc. without the
family’s consent.

A subset of participants, although acknowledging that a wrong had
occurred—one which should be prevented if at all possible—were stoic about
the problem.
I would not be at all upset about the event that just happened to my loved one if it was
truly due to a miscommunication or an erroneous authorization. I do realize that in
the confusing minutes surrounding an unexpected death, it is not always possible to
verify every fact . . . however, perhaps new procedures should be put in place to
prevent this from happening in the future.

The third common response was that the participant would not be upset at
all because their loved one was dead, would no longer need their body, and
something good had come from the situation. The following example is
representative of the prompts in this category.
I know she asked to be buried with all parts of her body, but I fail to see the downsides
of letting her organs be available for use. If she could witness what a blessing her
organs were—as grim as it sounds—she wouldn’t have any reservations about them
being used to help others.

In fact, one participant even argued, “People shouldn’t get a choice how
their body parts are handled because they don’t need them anymore. It’s pretty
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selfish.”
A subset of participants felt happy that the organs had been transplanted,
even if they would have followed their loved one’s wishes had they been given
the choice.
It may not be what my friend wished during his life, and I wouldn’t have chosen to act
against his wishes, but things worked out for the best . . . . A person’s life was saved
and she is no longer suffering. It seems as though it was meant to be. . . . I would
accept this outcome peacefully and joyfully.

Some participants did not directly engage with the imaginative aspect of the
prompt, but instead engaged in a philosophical discussion about the ethics of
forced organ donation.
I am adamantly opposed to any forced organ donations and accidental donations are a
step down the slippery slope. I have known a number of good people that have died
awaiting organs and [I] am aware of a number of wealthy slime that have cut the line
to be “rescued” numerous times (think Dick Cheney). We don’t want to be living on
some organ farm for the privileged.

Respondents in this category often referenced a “slippery slope”—that is, an
“accidental” organ donation could turn into forced organ donations.
V
LIMITATIONS
Our study was limited in several ways. First, it bears emphasis that this study
merely explored perceptions and preferences with regard to organtransplantation reform. This method is descriptive, not prescriptive. It does not
purport to say what would actually be the most efficacious, most moral, or most
overall preferable reform to organ-transplantation policy.
Second, our use of Mturk as a source of human subjects prevents us from
making direct claims about the policy preferences of the American public as
48
such. Nonetheless, our sample is significantly more heterogeneous and
representative than the undergraduate psychology students that are frequently
49
used for social-science research. Our weighted estimates more closely simulate
the potential views of the American public, given their political identifications.
Still, we cannot say whether the Republicans in our sample are similar to the
Republicans nationwide (and likewise for Democrats and independents), and
thus our study is no substitute for a national survey with a demographically
valid sample.
A third limitation of our study concerns the way in which we presented the
policy-reform choices. On the one hand, we did not present comprehensive
analyses of each policy proposition, which could have included extensive
evidence and arguments from advocates on both sides of the issue. That sort of
48. See Berinsky et al., supra note 30, at 361; Paolacci et al., supra note 30, at 412–13; Shapiro et
al., supra note 30, at 215–16.
49. Psychology undergraduates are used as subjects in two-thirds of the studies published by the
premier journal in the social-psychology field. Arnett, supra note 29, at 604; Henrich et al., supra note
29, at 63.
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extensive briefing, along with the potential for discourse and deliberation,
50
would have been required for truly informed choices. On the other hand, we
did not elicit raw preferences from subjects, which would have better avoided
any potential for the researchers biasing the results. Instead, we struck a
balance between these poles by offering a general background of the organ
shortage, and approximately 200-word explanations of each set of policy
choices. The context of these choices might be comparable to the degree of
information that a citizen gets from a newscast describing a proposed reform. It
thus might have some relevance to real-world opinion formation.
Still, it should be emphasized that this experiment tested opinions about
particular descriptions of policy reforms, rather than testing opinions about the
policy reforms themselves. It is likely that different formulations of these ideas
would yield different responses and that their political salience could refined or
51
otherwise manipulated by political actors.
VI
CONCLUSIONS
Let us return to Ronald Dworkin’s challenge that began the article:
Democracy can be healthy with no serious political argument if there is nevertheless a
broad consensus about what is to be done. It can be healthy even if there is no
consensus if it does have a culture of argument. But it cannot remain healthy with
deep and bitter divisions and no real argument, because it then becomes only a
52
tyranny of numbers.

Our data provides some hope for reaching consensus on organ-policy
reform. The data suggest that the issues of organ-transplantation policy might
not be as politically or culturally polarizing as one might suppose. Further, we
found that relative perceptions of mortal or posthumous risk do not drive policy
53
choices to a large extent. Our experimental manipulations as to the salience of
risk had little or no impact.
Likewise, one might have expected that divergent cultural frames would
have led subjects to become polarized after reading our balanced introductory
54
material, as Kahan and colleagues have found. Our subjects reported an openmindedness to reform, while distinguishing between attractive reforms (such as
moving to an opt-out system) and unattractive reforms (such as a regulated
market), and also distinguishing within each reform between evaluations of
morality and efficacy. Thus, we are not concerned that our human subjects were
simply non-compliant or distracted.
50. See James S. Fishkin, Robert Luskin & Roger Jowell, Deliberative Polling and Public
Consultation, 53 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 657, 660 (2000).
51. See generally JOHN HANSON, IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW (2012) (arguing that
human decisions are driven more by situations than dispositions).
52. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 6.
53. Cf. Kahan et al., Nanotechnology, supra note 7, at 87–88 (describing a “cultural predisposition
toward risk”).
54. Id.
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We did find broad consensus among both Democrats and Republicans that
a market for organs could be effective in increasing supply, but that it was
deeply problematic from a moral point of view, causing a lack of support
overall. Alternatively, the payment of vouchers for funeral expenses enjoyed
broad support. It is surprising that the two methods of financial incentives had
such different evaluations, though these differences might be due to the way
that the proposals are described in our stimuli. Teasing apart concerns about
efficacy from morality, the voucher program appeared to alleviate the deep
moral objections to a market, while nonetheless maintaining perceived efficacy.
Our study also suggests that a package of reforms, including reciprocal
preferences, opt-out, and elimination of the family veto, might be politically
feasible. This package of reforms likewise neutralizes moral objections to a
reform of reciprocal preferences alone.
Overall, it appears that once Americans are informed about the basic
aspects of the cadaveric organ shortage and given a chance to reflect upon
potential reforms in a balanced way, they are able to reach pragmatic and
coherent conclusions favoring certain reforms. Scholars should seek to exploit
whatever consensus does exist and press toward political and legal
implementation of sensible reforms. We should not be paralyzed by bugaboo
concerns of a polarized, paralyzed, and irrational electorate.
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX
A. Background Information Shown to All Subjects.
Over 50 years ago, surgeons pioneered organ transplantation as a treatment
for kidney failure. For many diseases – such as kidney, liver, heart, and lung
failure – organ transplantation is now the best, and sometimes the only,
treatment available for patients. In recent years, organ transplantation has
become even more effective, because of advances in drugs and transplantation
methods. Patients who receive transplanted organs are more likely to enjoy a
full recovery and return to a normal way of life.
However, in the United States, there has long been a shortage of organs for
transplantation. Currently, there are over 115,000 people on waiting lists to
receive organs, and these people must wait several months or years, depending
on which organs they need. Over 5,000 people die each year while waiting for
an organ for transplantation, while many others suffer while waiting for an
available organ.
It is possible, but very rare, to transplant some organs from living persons.
Undergoing such a surgery is, however, dangerous. And most organs, such as
hearts or lungs, are impossible to transplant from a live donor. Therefore, the
vast majority of organs come from cadavers – the bodies of dead persons. These
are called “cadaveric organs.”
Most people die in ways that make it impossible to use their organs for
transplantation. When a person dies in a way that leaves a healthy organ, it is
necessary to make a decision about its use shortly after death. Otherwise, if
there is too much of a delay, the organ degrades and becomes unusable for
transplantation. When organs are removed, the surgical procedure is performed
in a way that leaves the cadaver intact for whatever funeral arrangements may
be preferred, including the possibility of an open-casket funeral.
B. Writing Task Manipulations
Need Condition Stimulus
Imagine that someone you love is
suffering from progressive liver failure,
due to a genetic disease known as
hemochromatosis. The liver failure
becomes fatal as it progresses, and your
loved one needs an organ transplant or
else he or she will eventually die. There is,
however, a severe shortage of organs for
transplantations. Your loved one waits on
the list for several months. Unfortunately,
the shortage is so severe that he or she is
eventually informed that it will be
impossible to find an available organ in
time. Think deeply about how you would

Taken Condition Stimulus
Imagine that someone you love feels very
strongly that his or her body be buried in
its entirety, and thus your loved one
adamantly opposes that his or her organs
be taken for transplantation. Nonetheless,
imagine that your loved one dies suddenly
in a car accident, and when taken to the
hospital, the transplant team removes
some of his or her organs for
transplantation. It is not clear exactly how
this happened – whether it was because
the family authorized the transplantation,
or because some local law allowed
transplantation
without
consulting
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feel, and what you would think, when
learning that there is no organ available
for your loved one and that, as a result, he
or she will soon die. Write, in the space
below, your thoughts about this sequence
of events; try to think about and deeply
feel, and then write with enough detail so
that the reader will think and even feel the
same way.
[400-500 characters, please]

[Vol. 77:101

anyone’s preferences, or just because of
some miscommunication. Still, the
transplanted organs were actually used to
save the life of another person, a young
woman who was suffering at a nearby
hospital. Write, in the space below, your
thoughts about this sequence of events; try
to think about and deeply feel, and then
write with enough detail so that the reader
will think and even feel the same way.
[400-500 characters, please]

Note: The Control condition included no writing task.
C. Proposed Policy-Reform Pairs
Instructions
Each country sets its own laws and policies about organ transplantation, and they have
chosen different approaches. The following sections describe parts of the cadaveric
organ transplantation policy used within the United States, as well as proposals for how
to reform those parts in order to reduce the shortage of organs. Please carefully
consider each of the parts and how they might remain the same or be reformed. You
will later be asked to select which overall cadaveric organ transplantation policy you
most prefer be used within the United States. You will do this by indicating, for each
part, which position you most prefer.
Opt-In vs. Opt-Out
The United States currently uses an opt-in One proposal would change to an opt-out
model: if a person wants to have his or her system: organs will be transplanted from
organs transplanted after death, then he or the bodies of dead persons, unless those
she must actively fill out paperwork individuals had expressed a desire not to
signing up as a donor. If a person does not provide their organs. Advocates say that
sign up as a donor, then his or her organs this system is already in use by several
are usually not transplanted. Advocates of other countries as a way to reduce the
this system say that it embodies individual organ shortage, recognizing that many
choice, because a person will not become a people just never make a decision either
donor unless he or she actively decides to way. Polls show that most people would
be one. Moreover, an emphasis on want to have their organs transplanted,
donation reflects the value of altruism and the opt-out system reflects their
(i.e., selflessly caring for others).
preferences. Individuals who feel strongly
opposed
to
having
their
organs
transplanted could register that preference
instead by filling out paperwork.
Family Choice vs. Personal Choice
Regardless of whether a person signs up to One proposal focuses on the deceased
donate his or her organs, hospital staff person’s choice instead. This proposal
often ask any surviving members of the would change the law to prohibit hospital
family whether to transplant the organ. staff from asking surviving family
Advocates for this family choice practice members whether to transplant organs of
say that family members are in the best the deceased person. Instead, hospital
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position to know what the deceased
person would have wanted, regardless of
any donation paperwork he or she may
have filled out long ago. Moreover, the
family members are the ones who have to
live with the consequences of the choice to
donate or not. It is fitting that the
survivors get the final decision.
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staff would rely only upon the registration
status of the individual. Advocates of
personal choice argue that family
members should not be able to override
the free choice of the deceased person.
Moreover, the family members are likely
to be very upset by their recent loss. The
family may have clouded judgment and
experience further discomfort if the
hospital staff forces them to make this
decision.

Altruistic Donations vs. Regulated Market
Federal law currently prohibits the buying One proposal would allow organs to be
or selling of organs. Instead donations are bought and sold in a regulated market,
given on a volunteer basis without any similar to how federal law currently allows
financial compensation. Advocates of payment for sperm, egg, blood serum, and
keeping this law argue that it is necessary bone marrow. The physicians and nurses
to prevent sales of body parts, which that handle the transplant procedure are
would degrade human beings. In addition, paid for their services, after all. Advocates
organ sales could worsen inequality, of such a regulated market for organs
because the poor might feel more of an argue that the current law prohibiting
economic pressure to sell their organs than sales is a major cause of the shortage; we
the rich. A further worry is that a market instead need to create an incentive that
for selling organs could actually “crowd could increase the supply of organs. It is
out” those who are now willing to donate also fair to compensate people for their
altruistically, and thus reduce the number willingness to provide their organs, and
of organs available for transplantation.
fair to ask recipients of organs to pay for
the benefit.
Voluntarism Alone vs. Funeral Recognition
Currently, in the United States, there is no One proposal would recognize organ
official recognition or reward for persons donors by allowing health insurers to
who agree to have their organs cover their funeral expenses. This voucher
transplanted after they die.
would be limited to the average cost of a
Rather, donations are given on a funeral. This voucher would go to the
volunteer basis. Advocates of keeping this families of deceased persons whose organs
law argue that it is necessary to reflect the are transplanted. Advocates of the funeral
value of pure altruism (i.e., selflessly voucher argue that it could increase
caring for others). It would also be donations by those planning for their own
improper to cause people to make such an estates, and the voucher expense could
important decision on the basis of any come from the recipient’s health insurance
other factor, which may cloud their coverage. Also, since the amount of the
judgment or degrade their human dignity. voucher would be limited and could only
These advocates say that a system of be spent on funeral expenses, it would not
voluntarism alone is best.
be degrading nor would it worsen
inequality.
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Open Eligibility vs. Reciprocal Preference
Presently, the systems for receiving and One proposal is to give people who agreed
distributing
cadaveric
organs
are to provide their own organs upon death
completely separate. A patient is eligible priority access to the organ waiting list, if
to receive a transplanted organ even if he they
someday
need
an
organ
or she is not signed up as an organ donor transplantation. Advocates of such a
himself or herself. Advocates of such open “reciprocal preference” argue that during
eligibility argue that allocation of organs this time of shortage, it is fair to give
should be based purely on medical organs to those persons who are
criteria, and should not be made themselves willing to contribute to the
conditional on whether one has made the pool of organs. Those refusing to
decision to become a donor. Moreover, contribute do not deserve to take from the
the current policy preserves the value of pool. This proposal could increase the
altruism, because decisions to donate number of contributors, and could also
remain focused solely on helping another reduce demand for organs, by excluding
person, as opposed to receiving any those who refuse to contribute themselves.
personal benefit.
Finally, please consider a particular combination of some of the individual policy
reforms discussed above. This combined proposal involves reciprocal preferences, an
opt-out system, and personal choice, all in one package of reforms. To review these
features:
• First, the “reciprocal preferences” reform would give people who agreed to
provide their own organs upon death priority access, if they someday need an
organ transplantation. Thus, even while alive, one would receive a benefit from
their willingness to share.
• Second, under “opt-out” everyone would be in the organ system, with priority
access to get organs and also registered to give organs upon death, unless they
opted-out. Anyone would be free to opt-out from giving organs, thereby
removing their priority access to receiving organs as well.
• Third, under “personal choice,” the registration status of the individual would
control whether their organs are removed. The surviving members of the family
would not be asked. Now please indicate your preference for whether to stay in
our current system (on the left) or change to this combination of reforms (on
the right). For this purpose, please assume that this is the only potential reform
on the table.
Current Package
Open Eligibility
Opt-In
Family Choice

Reform Package
Reciprocal Preference
Opt-Out
Personal Choice

D. Scale
The bidirectional, anchored Likert-type scale that we used to collect data
about efficacy, morality, and overall preferences is shown in figure 3. We
converted the nonnumerical values to scores one through nine for analysis.
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Figure 3

d Data Clean
ning Procedu
ures
E. Recrruitment and
We at first paid $0.50 per completed response ((receiving fo
orty-five
responses), and then to
o expedite data
d
collectio
on, raised th
he payment to $0.75
per completted response
e (receiving 749 more). After four d
days of recruitment,
we reached 800 subjectss requesting payment, a target we h
had developeed based
on a prospecctive power analysis.
There were four dup
plicates, iden
ntified based on Mturk acccount numb
bers. We
then remove
ed thirty-six respondentts who failed
d either or b
both of the aattention
questions, le
eaving 764. We examined a histogrram showingg survey com
mpletion
times (witho
out yet exam
mining any other
o
respon
nse data), an
nd set a threeshold to
remove those that com
mpleted the survey in un
nder 6.99 m
minutes or o
over 35.1
hat screen re
emoved thirty-four moree responden
nts, leaving 7730. We
minutes. Th
also visually
y inspected the respon
nses to the mandatory writing pro
ompts to
determine iff any had prrovided seve
erely nonresp
ponsive dataa, but found no such
junk. Thus, the final cou
unt for analysses was n = 7730.

